Plaintiffs arguing trademark fame for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis is about as common as defendants arguing the plaintiff’s trademark is conceptually weak. Plaintiffs want to establish trademark fame because strong marks are entitled to a broad scope of protection. For the record, trademark fame for likelihood of confusion purposes is different from fame for trademark dilution purposes.
More often than not, a trademark fame argument fails not because the evidence of fame does not exist, but because the plaintiff fails to properly admit the evidence to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. During the discovery period it is easy to get fixated on obtaining the evidence the party needs and not on the admissibility of the evidence being acquired. This was the problem Diesel S.p.A. encountered in its recent case before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
Misel Disel, LLC filed an application seeking registration on the Principal Register of the mark MISEL DISEL (in standard characters) for “smooth shave enhancer, namely, pre-shave liquid.” The Trademark Office reviewed the application and found no conflicting marks that would bar registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d). The MISEL DISEL mark was published for opposition and Diesel S.p.A. opposed the registration of the mark.
Diesel was the owner of several prior registrations for DIESEL (in standard characters) and DIESEL formative marks, but the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board focused on one: DIESEL (in standard characters) for, among other goods, “pre- and after shave creams and lotions.” The Board found that the MISEL DISEL and DIESEL marks were similar, the goods closely related, and there was no weakness based on the co-existence of third-party registrations. Misel only came up with three registrations for DIESEL and none were for goods remotely close to pre- and after shave creams and lotions.
Diesel argued that its DIESEL mark was famous for likelihood of confusion purposes. To support this argument, it relied on documents only. It offered no testimony, which was Disel’s fatal mistake.
Financial information is key to establishing trademark fame, but this information must be offered through testimony. It is not self-authenticating evidence. Web pages can be self-authenticating, but the Web pages are admissible of what they show on their face only, not to prove the truth of any matter asserted in the them.
Documents produced in response to a Document Request are also inadmissible unless other authenticated through a Request for Admission.
Because Diesel did not give any consideration to admissibility, it was left with minimal evidence on trademark fame and the Board was unable to find that the DIESEL was famous for likelihood of confusion purposes.